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EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS ANDMARKET POWER:
EVIDENCE FROM OCEAN SHIPPING*
PedroL.MarIŁ nwandRichard Sicottez
There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of
loyalty contracts, but relatively little empirical work. We employ the
event study methodology to examine the competitive effects of
exclusionary contracts in the ocean shipping industry, where they were
the subject of an extended legal and political struggle.We find that some
of themost important events in this conflict caused significant changes in
shipping firms’ stock returns, indicating exclusive contracts increased
their profits.We then examine the effect of these events on net exporting
industries’ stock returns, and provide evidence that these contracts
contributed to carriers’ market power.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE USE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS and other loyalty-inducing instruments is
one of the most controversial issues in competition policy. Despite the
existence of a considerable theoretical literature, there is still much
disagreement about the key question of whether the primary effect of
exclusive contracts is to enhance efficiency or to contribute to market
power.1 Moreover, much of the literature has focused on exclusive dealing
relationships between manufacturers and retailers, although this is but one
example of loyalty-based pricing policies employed by firms.2
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1Aghion and Bolton [1987], and Ramseyer, Rasmusen and Wiley [1991] contend that
contracts can confer market power. For the opposing position, see Director and Levi [1956],
and Innes and Sexton [1994].
2 The literature on exclusive dealing in this regard is voluminous. SeeMarvel [1982], Ornstein
[1989], Heide, Dutta and Bergen [1998], Slade [1998], Bernheim and Whinston [1998].
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In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the economic effects of
exclusive contracts between firms and the ultimate consumers of their
product. Empirical studies of such contracts have been relatively neglected,
perhaps because of the difficulty in obtaining detailed data on the types and
numbers of consumers that do and do not sign such contracts. We
circumvent these problems by applying the event study methodology to a
particular case of regulation and litigation that dealt precisely with the issue
of exclusive contracts.
Ocean shipping cartels have employed exclusive contracts for more than
one hundred years.3 The cartel carriers have never denied that the
motivation for employing exclusive contracts is to deter entry. They have
simply argued that competitive entry is ‘destructive’ and that industry self-
regulation ensures the survival of regularly scheduled liner shipping services,
and therefore is efficient. Consumers and rival non cartel carriers who
opposed the use of these contracts charged that they contributed to market
power in the industry to the detriment of competition, efficiency and
consumers. Our objective is to provide evidence on the merit of these
competing hypotheses.
The event study is especially well suited to our aim. In the United States,
the ocean shipping industry was embroiled in an extended legal conflict
during the 1950s, at the center of which were exclusive contracting practices.
After years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1958, ruled that
exclusive contracts that reduced or eliminated competition in ocean
shipping were illegal.4 A political struggle ensued, which was only resolved
in 1961 with the passage of amendments to the Shipping Act that legalized
the use of exclusive contracts.
We examine the impact on ocean carriers’ stock returns of several key
events in this tumultuous period, each of which transmitted information
specifically on the probability that exclusive contracts would be prohibited.
We find that some events resulted in significant changes in the market’s
assessment of firms’ prospects, indicating that exclusive contracts were
indeed highly beneficial to ocean carriers. We then examine the effect of
these events on net exporting industries, as customers of ocean carriers.5We
find strong evidence supporting the view that the primary object of exclusive
contracts in ocean shippingwas to augment the cartels’market power, not to
enhance efficiency and provide benefits to customers.
3 The ocean liner shipping industry is permitted to organize cartels (conferences) because of
exemptions from competition laws in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.
4 Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
5We are following the precedent set by Mullin, Mullin and Mullin [1995] of analyzing the
effects of events on customers so as to distinguish between market power and efficiency
hypotheses.
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II. ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON LOYALTY CONTRACTS
One of the first contributions related to loyalty contracts is that of Director
and Levi [1956]. Posner [1976] and Bork [1978] developed their position
further. These authors maintain that contracts are not a useful device to
deter entry. They argue that firms will have to compensate customers fully
for their exclusive patronage and that the price, after the loyalty discount, is
equal to the competitive price.
Aghion and Bolton [1987] develop a model in which an incumbent
monopolist offers a contract price and also sets a penalty for breaking the
contract. Successful entrants need to fix a price below or equal to the
monopolist’s contract price. They demonstrate that when there is
uncertainty about themarginal cost of the potential entrant, themonopolist
can deter entry of more efficient competitors by setting a high enough
penalty, while maintaining a price above the competitive level. In Aghion
and Bolton’s model, the monopolist compensates the buyer fully as in
Director and Levi, Posner and Bork. Despite this, the monopolist is still
better off because it acquires some of the entrant’s expected profits through
the contract.6
Ramseyer, Rasmusen and Wiley [1991] provide an example of how
exclusive contracts can result in supra-competitive prices. In their model,
both themonopolist and the potential entrant face a decreasing average cost
function up to some capacity, the minimum efficient scale, and constant
average costs beyond that point. Accordingly, entry will occur only if its
share of the aggregate demand of those customers not signing the loyalty
contract exceeds the minimum efficient scale. In some cases, in equilibrium,
assuming there is no coordination among consumers, the monopolist only
needs to offer a small discount from the monopoly price in order to deter
entry. All customers will sign the contract since they know that the
monopolist can deter entry by attracting enough loyal customers such that
the remaining demand is not large enough to induce entry. Consumers who
do not sign pay the monopoly price, while signatories pay a slightly smaller
price. In order for loyalty contracts to deter entry, the only important
assumptions required are that customers cannot coordinate and that there
are increasing returns to scale for some levels of production. Innes and
Sexton [1994] show that if consumers can form coalitions loyalty contracts
may be efficient.
Several other recent contributions, with different approaches, also have
taken the position that loyalty contracts can exclude lower cost entry.
Klemperer [1987] views loyalty contracts, even of a weak variety, such as
airlines’ frequent flier programs, as a type of artificial switching cost that
raises prices above what would obtain had such contracts not been
6Aghion and Bolton [1987], p. 391. 
3
introduced.7 Finally, Sjostrom [1988] andYong [1996] havemodeled the use
of loyalty contracts in ocean transport. They both conclude that if entrants
are capacity-constrained, the contracts can serve as a barrier to entry, and
that consumers actually benefit from the contracts. Yong points out that the
unique subgameperfect equilibrium in hismodel is less socially efficient than
an outcome in which the lower cost entrant supplies up to its capacity, and
the higher cost incumbent provides the remainder of the service.8
III. LOYALTY CONTRACTS IN THE OCEAN SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Since the late nineteenth century, ocean carriers have organized cartels
known as shipping conferences. In Europe, Regulation 4056/86 grants
shipping conferences a block exemption from Article 81(1) of the Treaty of
Rome. In the United States, the Shipping Act requires that conferences
submit their agreements to the Federal Maritime Commission and that, if
approved, the members may engage in price and quantity fixing.
Conferences are organized by route; for example, there may exist one
conference covering trade betweenNorthernEurope and the Pacific ports of
the U.S. and another covering trade between Northern Europe and U.S.
Gulf ports. In addition, firms do not always participate in conferences on all
the routes they serve, although this wasmuchmore the case in the 1950s, the
period of our analysis, than the present. Conferences are very heterogeneous
in their structure and membership. Table I illustrates that most conferences
in the 1950s had fewer than eleven members.
From their origins, conferences have offered loyalty contracts to their
customers. The first of these to gain wide use was the deferred rebateFan
Table I
Size andNumberofApproved Steamship Confer-
ences,1958
Number of Members Number of Conferences
2 – 6 48
7 – 11 35
12 – 16 24
17 – 21 10
22 – 26 4
27 or more 1
Source: John S. McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the
American Merchant Marine, 1960,
7 Viard [2002] extends Klemperer’s [1987] model, demonstrating that switching costs might
either raise or lower prices, depending upon the relative importance of new customers in a
market.
8Yong [1996], p. 123.
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instrument still applied by conferences in non-U.S. trades.9 Under this
system, customers who patronize conference members exclusively for six
months receive a rebate, usually equal to ten percent of the freight rate paid.
This rebate is paid in two parts. The first half is paid after an additional six
months of exclusive patronage, and the second, after yet another six-month
period of loyalty. This type of contract was the subject of intense scrutiny by
both the British and U.S. governments in the early part of the 20th century.
At the conclusion of a multi-year investigation, the United Kingdom’s
Royal Commission on Shipping Rings concluded that the deferred rebate
was essential to prevent the cutthroat competition of tramp steamers. In
contrast, the U.S. Congress prohibited deferred rebates in the Shipping Act
of 1916.
Subsequently, many conferences in U.S. trades began to use dual-rate
contracts in order to inspire customer loyalty.Under this device, conferences
charge two separate rate structures, contract and non-contract rates. Table
II illustrates the frequency distribution of the spread between contract and
non-contract rates by conferences in 1958. Those customers who sign dual-
rate contracts with the conference pay the lower contract rate. If a customer
violates the terms of the contract by shipping cargo on a non-conference
vessel, itmust pay liquidated damages. Themost commondamageswere the
payment that the client would havemade had it shipped with the conference
at contract rates.10 It was not unusual if the penalty was a multiple of this
contract rate. It is evident dual-rate contracts are strikingly similar to the
contracts modeled in the economics literature.
Table II
FrequencyDistribution of Spreads inDual-rate Agreements of Steamship
Conferences
No. of Conferences Amount of Spread No. of Conferences Amount of Spread
1 10% 18 $3
1 12.5% 14 $4
2 15% 8 $4.50
17 20% 5 $5
1 19% – 31% 2 $5.50
1 $2 per ton 2 $6
1 $2.50 2 $20
Source: U.S. House Special Subcomm. on Steamship Conferences, 1959, p. 620.
9Article 5(2) of European Regulation 4056/86 permits both deferred rebates and dual-rate
contracts, but mandates that conferences offer exporters a choice between the two. The
regulation also mandates that exporters are ‘‘released from their obligation of loyalty’’ if the
conferences provide inadequate service.
10 For a detailed description of the contract terms, see U.S. House Subcomm. on Antitrust
(1962), pp. 189–209.
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Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that conferences used dual-rate
contracts to prevent entry. For example, during the congressional
investigations of shipping conferences in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
documents obtained from an ocean carrier contained an admission that ‘the
entire contract system is a fighting measure to get rid of outside
competition.’11 Even the head of the Federal Maritime Board, the
regulatory agency charged with policing the conference system, stated that
‘the purpose and intent of the dual-rate system is to drive out non-conference
competition.’12
Entry deterrence, the carriers argued,was ‘indispensable to the strength of
a conference,’ and conferences were essential to promote rate stability and
regular service.13 Shipping companies argued, therefore, that dual-rate
contracts did not impede trade but instead promoted it. In particular, rate
stability, if a result of conferences, encourages the signing of forward
contracts between exporters and importers in much the same way that it is
argued that fixed exchange rates also foment trade. There is considerable
evidence that liner rates are indeed much more stable than those charged by
competitive tramp shipping (which primarily serves bulk commodities such
as crude oil, grain and coal).14 Further, surveys of exporters and importers
show that, in addition to price, reliability and quality of service are
important considerations. In a recent survey of over 250 firms that are
customers of ocean shipping, thirty-one percent listed price as their top
concern. Twenty-two percent listed reliability, and the remainder pointed to
issues such as document quality and customer service. About fifty percent
stated that they ‘would sacrifice a fewdays of shipping time for a lower price,
but sixty-two percent said they were reluctant to switch carriers based solely
on price.’15 Such responses indicate that non price impacts of dual-rate
contracts could be potentially important in determining their ultimate effect
on shippers.
Some treatments of the shipping conference question in the recent
economics literature, such as those by Pirrong [1992] and Sjostrom [1989],
maintain that the liner shippingmarket has an empty core. They believe that
cartels are a necessary and efficient response to the absence of a competitive
equilibrium. Their position echoes the informal arguments made by
executives of shipping corporations.16
11 Ibid., p. 216.
12 Ibid.
13U.S. House Subcomm. on Antitrust (1962), pp. 216–22, and U.S. Senate Comm. on
Commerce (1961), pp. 204, 209.
14 Bennathan and Walters [1969], pp. 51–59.
15 Journal of Commerce, email edition, October 8 1999.
16U.S. House Comm. on Merch. Marine & Fisheries (1914) and U.S. House Subcomm. on
Antitrust (1962).
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The basis for our empirical investigation is an intense legal and political
struggle over the use of dual-rate contracts in ocean shipping. In 1958, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that conferences’ use of dual-rate
contracts was illegal if it had the effect of eliminating competition. Three
years later, Congress approved legislation definitively legalizing dual-rate
contracts with much less regard for competitive considerations.
In the 1950s, approximately one-half of steamship conferences in
American trades offered dual-rate contracts.17 According to statistics
compiled in 1959, in trans-Atlantic trades, more than 37,000 exporters were
signatories of such contracts. More than 60,000 such contracts were in
effect in U.S.–Latin American trades, and over 20,000 in U.S.–Asian
commerce.18
The controversy over dual-rate contracts largely stemmed from the
persistent legal complaints by the Isbrandtsen Co., an independent, non-
conference carrier, against conferences’ use of dual-rate contracts. In the
first case, Isbrandtsen protested the FederalMaritime Board’s approval of a
dual-rate contract system in the North Atlantic trade. On March 21, 1951,
the U.S. district court ruled that the contract’s twenty percent spread was
‘arbitrary and unreasonable.’19 This decision was affirmed by an equally
divided Supreme Court onMarch 10, 1952. On the same date, however, in a
related case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Maritime Board had
to first be consulted in any decision surrounding the approval of dual-rate
contracts.20 This was a major victory for the carriers since the Federal
Maritime Board was openly sympathetic to carriers’ arguments about the
validity and justifiability of dual-rate contracts.
The most controversial case involved shipping between the United States
and Japan. By the early 1950s, Isbrandtsen was carrying approximately
thirty percent of all liner cargo from Japan to the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf
coasts.21 Late in 1952, the Japan–Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference
announced its plan to introduce a dual-rate contract system in order to fight
the non-conference carrier’s gains. The Federal Maritime Board quickly
granted interim approval, but Isbrandtsen successfully petitioned the courts
for an injunction until the F.M.B. reached its final decision after required
hearings. Without the protective shield of exclusive contracts, the
conference lines initiated a price war, cutting freight rates by up to seventy
percent on some commodities. After continued procedural haggling, the
F.M.B. formally approved the conference’s request in December 1955.
17Congressional Record, September 13 1961, pp. 18167–68.
18 Ibid., p. 18176; U.S. House Subcomm. on Antitrust (1962), p. 186.
19 Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (SDNY, 1951).
20A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. 342 U.S. 950 (1952); Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
21 Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. 356 U.S. 481, at 485 (1958).
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Isbrandtsen immediately appealed the agency’s decision to the courts, and
on November 9, 1956, the Court of Appeals handed down a verdict for
Isbrandtsen and against the legality of dual-rate contracts.22 It ruled that the
F.M.B. could not approve dual-rate contracts, because they were not
permitted to do so under the ShippingAct. OnMarch 25, 1957, the Supreme
Court announced that it would hear the case. Because the Court of Appeals
had already ruled against the contracts, the granting of certiorari can be
considered a victory for the appellants (the F.M.B., and by extension the
carriers).However, onMay 19, 1958, the SupremeCourt upheld theAppeals
Court’s verdict, deciding that dual-rate contracts that eliminated or
curtailed competition were illegal.23 That same day, the conferences’
political allies in Congress introduced legislation to legalize dual-rate
contracts for a period of two years, during which time Congress would
investigate the issue. This legislation did not encounter serious opposition
and was enacted in August 1958.24
Both the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee conducted
investigations during 1959–1960. On February 15, 1961, legislation was
introduced to legalize dual-rate contracts permanently. On May 4, under
intense pressure from Judiciary Committee chairman Emanuel Celler and
the Department of Justice, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee reported a bill instructing the Federal Maritime Board to
approve only those dual-rate contracts that would not exclude independent
carriers. This was a severe blow to the aspirations of the shipping industry.
The House of Representatives approved the bill in June, and the legislation
moved to the Senate. The Senate Commerce Committee rewrote the bill,
permitting the Federal Maritime Board far more flexibility in approving
dual-rate contracts than was allowed in the House version. The Senate
approved the committee bill withminor amendments, and theHouse-Senate
conference approved the Senate version with only slight changes. There was
considerable speculation about whether President Kennedy would veto the
bill. Yet, onSeptember 29, 1961, theWhiteHouse signaled that thePresident
would not veto, and the bill became law in early October.
The chronology contains numerous events that conveyed information
about the probability that dual-rate contracts would be prohibited. These
events will be critical in our tests of whether the contracts contributed to
carriers’ profitability, and whether their ultimate effect is to improve
efficiency or expand market power.
22 Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 99 U.S. App. D.C. 312, 239 F.2d. 933
(1956).
23 Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
24 Congress later extended the interim legislation until September 1961.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Although Fama, Fisher, Jensen andRoll [1969] first utilized event studies to
test the efficient market hypothesis, since then the method has been
employed widely to analyze the effects of regulation on firms’ perfor-
mance.25 This is accomplished by testing for the effects of specific regulatory
events on time series of stock returns. The implication is that a positive
regulatory development will cause an abnormally high return to occur
immediately following the dissemination of the information contained in the
event.
In our discussion of dual-rate contracts, we identified a period during
which their very existence was called into question by legal and political
challenges. By examining the effect ofmajor events during this period on the
returns of securities of members of steamship conferences that employed
dual-rate contracts, we effectively test whether dual-rate contracts
contributed positively to firms’ profitability. If, following an event that
increased the probability that dual-rate contracts would be prohibited, we
observe abnormally low stock returns, then we can conclude that dual-rate
contracts improve the financial prospects of conference members.26 By
extension, we are also testing whether or not ocean shipping conferences
were able to enforce such contracts with their customers.
The validity of such tests depends upon a careful selection of events. First,
if other important occurrences took place simultaneously with the selected
events, the results will be severely biased. In order to avoid this pitfall, we
examined the key U.S. periodical that covers the shipping industry, the
Journal of Commerce.We eliminated any potential legal or legislative events
that coincided with other events of importance in the industry or to specific
firms. This led to the elimination of several events. We do not consider the
Court of Appeals 1956 decision, because it coincided with the outbreak of
hostilities in theMiddle East, which led to the closure of the Suez Canal with
dramatic repercussions for international shipping. In addition, we omit
from our analysis several steps in the legislative process that coincided with
other important events such as maritime labor strikes, subsidy legislation,
and reform of the regulatory agency.
25 For a survey, see Schwert [1981]. Examples are Binder [1985], Rose [1985], Mullin,Mullin
and Mullin [1995], Fisher Ellison and Mullin [1995].
26 The results may underestimate the impact of dual-rate contracts if firms were able to
employ an alternative means of deterring entry that served as a close substitute, such as
predatory pricing. Yamey [1972], Scott Morton [1997], and Podolny and Scott Morton [1999]
present evidence on predation by shipping cartels in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In particular, Scott Morton’s [1997] results support the deep-pocket theory, which
suggests that predation in the 1950s and 1960s may have been a viable alternative to dual-rate
contracts against weakly financed entrants. The possibility did not escape the attention of
Congress during its investigation in 1959–1960. SeeU.S.House Subcomm.onAntitrust (1962),
pp. 285–298.
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Second, the event study method will not detect significant abnormal
returns if the events were anticipated long in advance or their impact was not
fully realized until much later. To address this issue, we studied different
event windows; in particular, one, three and five week event windows
centered on the event.
We followed the same methodology for analyzing the effect of dual rate
contracts on customers. If dual rate contracts result in higher freight rates,
U.S. firms would face higher costs of exporting, but their foreign
competitors would also have to pay higher transport prices to ship products
to theU.S.market. It follows that if dual rate contracts raise freight rates, net
exporting industries would be harmed and net importing industries would
benefit. The converse would be true if dual rate contracts lowered freight
rates. Consequently, if we detect abnormal stock returns for firms from net
exporting industries, and the signs of the coefficients are the same as for the
shipping companies, we would conclude that exclusive contracts reduced
costs for firms in net exporting industries, and that any market power effect
was justified by efficiency improvements. If we observe instead that the
coefficients are significant but with signs different from those for the
shipping companies, we would conclude that customers were harmed by the
contracts and anticipated benefits from their elimination.
In order to execute these tests we estimate the following regression
equation:




where Rit denotes the stock return in period t for either firm i or portfolio i,
Rmt is the market return in period t, Dk are dummy variables related to the
event, and uit is an error term. The inclusion of the market return, Rmt, will
allow us to isolate the fluctuations caused specifically by the event.27We test
one, three and five week event windows. A one week event window
corresponds to aDkwith value equal to unity for theweekwhen eventk takes
place and zero otherwise. Three and five week event windows setDk equal to
unity also for one or two weeks before and after the week in which the event
actually occurred.
V. DATA
We collected weekly stock prices from Barron’s for U.S. steamship
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange for the period January
1950 to July 1962. These companies are U.S. Lines, Moore-McCormack,
and American Export Lines. Table III shows the number of conferences
27 See MacKinlay [1997] for an extensive review and discussion of the literature. 
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where each of these firms was participating and the number of those that
employed dual-rate contracts. Moore-McCormack participated almost
exclusively in conferences using dual-rate contracts. Over one-half of the
conferences to which U.S. Lines belonged employed dual-rate contracts,
whereas American Export Lines was a member of such conferences forty-
two percent of the time. These three firms were large American steamship
corporations that participated in conferences on nearly all of the routes
where they were active. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that they had a
considerable stake in the dual-rate system to the extent it supported the
conference system. Unfortunately, we do not have more detailed data that
would permit us to determine exactly the extent to which these firms
depended upon revenues from the ‘dual-rate routes.’ Nonetheless, the
evidence suggests that U.S. Lines and Moore-McCormack especially
depended upon such routes. Moreover, the lines that make up our sample
were among the highest cost lines in the international liner shipping industry.
It was widely held among industry experts and trade publications that if
dual-rate contracts would be abolished, they would suffer the consequences
disproportionately.28
We calculatedweekly stock returns, corrected for stock dividends for each
of the sample firms. From these data we constructed equally weighted
indexes as well as indexes in which firms are weighted based upon their
participation in conferences that employ dual-rate contracts.
We attempted to obtain stock returns for independent, non-conference
carriers as well. If the hypothesis that exclusive contracts contributed to
market power were correct, the prohibition of their use would have had a
positive impact on independent carriers’ stock returns.Unfortunately, stock
price data for independent carriers are not available during our period of
study. Most of these firms were closely held, often dominated by a single
individual or family (like Isbrandtsen).
In addition, it is logical that any market power or efficiencies achieved by
the conference carriers would have an impact on customers. If dual-rate
Table III





Number of conferences in which the firm participates 19 15 12
Conferences that employ dual-rate contracts 11 13 5
Per cent 58% 87% 42%
Source: Calculated from U.S. House Subcomm. on Antitrust, 1962, pp. 50–51, 56, and 186–87.
28 See, for example, the comments of Senator Estes Kefauver in U.S. Senate, Doc. No. 100
(1962), p. 295; Congressional Record, September 13 1961, p. 18168. 
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contracts contributed to market power and did not confer efficiency gains
that outweighed this negative effect, then the increased freight rates would
have been more harmful to industries for which exports constituted a
relatively high percentage of industry sales.
Standard and Poor published a large number of industry level stock
indexes in the 1950s and 1960s.29 We gathered weekly index values for
industries that produced goods shipped by sea. The industry indexes are not
created from the stock prices of all firms in an industry, but rather only those
publicly traded firms chosen by Standard and Poor. These firms tended to be
the largest and most important firms in an industry. The results that follow
may not hold for small firms (more below).We then assembled data onU.S.
foreign trade and total output of these industries’ products, calculating net
exports as a percentage of total production for each industry.30 Finally, we
 Table IV
Definition of DichotomousVariables
Variable Event Expected Sign
for Carriers
Court 1 US District Court rules for Isbrandtsen in
North Atlantic case (March 21, 1951).

Court 2 Supreme Court rules in North Atlantic and
Far East cases (March 10, 1952).
þ
Court 3 Supreme Court grants certiorari in Japan–Atlantic
case (March 25, 1957).
þ
Court 4 Supreme Court rules for Isbrandtsen. Bill introduced
in Congress to temporarily legalize dual-rate contracts
(May 19, 1958).
þ / (þ if legislative event
dominates;  of judicial
event dominates)
Legislative 1 Bill introduced in Congress to permanently legalize
dual-rate contracts (February 15, 1961).
þ
Legislative 2 House Merchant Marine Committee reports bill
that would restrict dual-rate contracts (May 4, 1961).

Legislative 3 White House signals that President Kennedy will
not veto (September 29, 1961).
þ
29 The stock price indexes are from Standard and Poor’s Trade and Securities, Security Price
Index Record. The list of the industries includes: Agricultural Machinery, Aluminum,
Automobiles, Beverages-Brewers, Beverages-Distillers, Beverages-Soft Drinks, Building
Materials-Cement, Carpets and Rugs, Chemicals, Confectionery, Containers-Metal and
Glass, Containers-Paper, Drugs, Electrical Equipment, Electrical Household Appliances,
Food-Dairy Products, Food-Meat Packing, Machine Tool Builders, Machinery-Specialty,
Metal Fabricating, Office and Business Equipment, Paper, Railroad Equipment, Rayon &
Acetate Yarn, Shoes, Soaps, Steel, Textiles-Apparel, Textiles-Weavers, Tires and Rubber
Goods, Tobacco-Cigarette Manufacturers, Vegetable Oils.
30 The foreign trade data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce
and Navigation of the United States, 1946–1963. The output data are from the U.S. Census of
Manufactures, 1963, Volume 1. All output and trade data are for the year 1963, the available
data closest to our sample. In calculating net exports for each industry, we omitted all trade
between the United States and Canada for these products, the preponderance of which travels
by land. Trade, output and freight data were matched using Standard International Trade
Classification codes and product descriptions in the primary sources.
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obtained data on freight costs as a percent of the value of each industry’s
exports in order to examine the hypothesis that industries with especially
high freight costs would be more negatively affected by dual-rate contracts
than other industries.31We used these data to construct indexes in which we
weighted individual industries based upon net exports, freight costs, or a
combination of the two. We also identified specific industries that should
have been especially sensitive to changes in freight rates: industries that
either exported or imported a substantial portion of their output, and/or
where freight rates constituted an especially large percentage of the value of
the goods produced.
The events that we selected are shown in Table IV. The first four are
important steps in the legal proceedings while the last three are important
legislative developments. Table IV also presents the expected sign for each
event under the hypothesis that dual-rate contracts did indeed bestow
additional profitability to the sample ocean carriers and that the event was
not fully anticipated.
VI. RESULTS
We estimate equation (1) for an index of the shipping industry, individual
shipping companies, indexes of exporting industries and individual
industries, as well as for different specifications of the event window. In all
cases we use the Standard and Poor’s composite index, the most broadly
based portfolio available, for the market return, Rmt. In addition, we apply
theNewey-Westmethodology to estimate the standard errors that allows for
autocorrelation. After calculating the Ljung-Box Q statistic for autocorre-
lation we allow up to a maximum of three lags.32
TableVpresents the results of regressions of an index of the three shipping
companies, in which each firm receives a weight corresponding to the
percentage of conferences in which the firm participates that employ dual-
rate contracts.33 The oneweek specification provides clearly superior results
in terms of statistical significance, which is not surprising since larger event
windowsmay encompass additional important events unrelated to dual-rate
contracts. In the one week specification, furthermore, the signs of the
coefficients support the contention that dual-rate contracts were highly
31We thank David Hummels for providing us with these data. These data are from the U.S.
Census, and are for 1994. It is reasonable to assume that the relative importance of freight costs
for these industries was similar during the period of our study, because the ratio is closely
related to products’ physical characteristics.
32 See Hayashi [2000]. Furthermore, we tested the equations for unit roots using the
approach of Dickey and Fuller – the series were integrated of order zero. This confirms the
suspicion that with data of this nature stationarity problems would not be an issue.
33We conducted the estimations using an equally weighted index and the results are




Length of Event Window
Variable One Week Three Weeks Five Weeks







  0.006  0.002
(3.92) (1.09) (0.51)
Court 4 0.030






Legislative 2  0.004  0.013  0.005
(22.83) (2.81) (0.64)
Legislative 3 0.027
  0.014  0.007
(29.21) (1.92) (1.67)
Notes: Number of observations: 651.
t-statistics in parentheses in absolute values.

significant at less than the 1% level.
The index includes three companies: U.S. Lines, Moore-McCormack and American Export Lines, weighted
by the percentage of conferences in which the firm participates that employ dual-rate contracts.
TableVI
Individual carriers
Variable U.S. Lines Moore-McCormack American Export Lines



































Notes: Number of observations: 651.
t-statistics in parentheses in absolute values

significant at less than the 1% level.
valuable to the ocean carriers. The coefficient for Court 4 deserves special 
mention, since the above interpretation of added profitability is valid if one 
believes that the legislative event (the congressional response to the 
Isbrandtsen decision) dominated the impact of the Supreme Court decision 
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itself. Even if one does not accept that explanation, the remaining events are
all strongly suggestive of the value of dual-rate contracts.Wehesitate to read
too much into the actual magnitudes of these coefficients, as they may or
may not be indicative of the relative importance of the events, because the
degree towhich each eventwas anticipated could have been quite different.34
Nonetheless, the largest of these coefficients, that for Legislative 1, is 0.122,
implying that dual-rate contracts had substantial impact on the firms.
We present results for the individual firms using a one week event window
in Table VI, and they confirm the results from the index regressions.35 It is
interesting to note that U.S. Lines and Moore-McCormack, which
participated in a higher percentage of conferences using dual-rate contracts
than American Export Lines, have coefficients that are very much in
agreement, and which strongly support the hypothesis that dual-rate
contracts contributed to these firms’ profitability. Of the three firms, the
regressions on the stock returns of American Export Lines are the least
consistent with that hypothesis.
 TableVII
Industry indexes









(30.79) (18.79) (12.54) (20.67)
Court 2  0.013  0.012  0.018  0.012
(23.25) (21.06) (21.43) (15.27)
Court 3  0.015  0.013  0.027  0.017
(28.27) (21.33) (32.55) (21.96)
Court 4  0.008 0.001  0.017 0.000
(10.64) (0.38) (15.83) (0.09)
Legislative 1  0.033  0.019  0.022  0.033
(48.30) (27.24) (22.13) (33.07)
Legislative 2  0.017  0.016  0.022  0.024
(17.15) (15.81) (16.19) (17.24)
Legislative 3  0.015  0.013  0.002  0.021
(28.39) (20.76) (2.48) (26.17)
Notes: Number of observations: 651.
t-statistics in parentheses in absolute values.

significant at less than the 1% level and sign opposite to shipping industry.
Columns:
(1) Index is a simple average, assigning a positive sign to exporters and a negative sign to importers.
(2) Industries are weighted by net exports.
(3) Industries are weighted by freight, assigning a positive sign to exporters and a negative sign to importers.
(4) Industries are weighted by net exports and freight.
34One possibility is that observers could have anticipated the court decisions if theywere able
to glean information from judges’ questions on the dates when the cases were argued.
Additional regression results, available on request, provide weak support for that hypothesis.
35Results for the three andfiveweek specifications for the individual firms are consistentwith
the index results using those same event windows.
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In order to distinguish between market power and efficiency hypotheses,
we examine the effect of these events on net exporting industries. Those
results are presented in Table VII. In each case we use a one week event
window. In column one, the dependent variable is an equally weighted index
of all the industries’ stock returns, where net exporting industries are
assigned a positive sign and net importing industries are assigned a negative
sign.36 The index best permits us to avoid the possibility that the coefficients
are determined by idiosyncratic (industry-specific) shocks that are not
related to the shipping industry. The coefficients are statistically significant,
and the signs of the coefficients are opposite those of the shipping industry
index (as reported in Table V) in every case except Legislative 2. The results
strongly support the hypothesis that dual-rate contracts did augment
market power, and if they did permit the carriers to achieve efficiencies,
those benefits were not passed on to exporters in a sufficient degree to offset
the effect of their increase in market power. Legislative 2 is the only event of
the seven that is supportive of an efficiency explanation for dual-rate
contracts.
TableVIII























(1.10) (51.91) (7.14) (13.54) (24.62) (27.86) (12.80)
Court 2  0.010  0.007  0.012  0.006  0.015 0.001  0.022
(13.28) (11.77) (14.60) (7.10) (21.08) (2.09) (21.44)
Court 3  0.012  0.013  0.011  0.004  0.018  0.004 0.011
(15.97) (22.74) (13.17) (5.05) (25.07) (5.22) (10.31)
Court 4 0.030  0.010  0.005  0.005  0.001 0.001 0.001
(29.04) (11.96) (4.84) (5.49) (0.73) (1.44) (1.21)
Legislative 1 0.014  0.022 0.007  0.020  0.010 0.012  0.048
(14.96) (29.05) (7.73) (21.25) (11.51) (14.72) (41.86)
Legislative 2  0.007  0.004  0.016  0.020 0.001 0.013  0.006
(5.35) (3.50) (11.14) (15.79) (1.15) (11.73) (4.09)
Legislative 3  0.019  0.019  0.001  0.001  0.013 0.001  0.003
(26.16) (31.94) (0.71) (1.42) (17.56) (0.80) (2.44)
Notes: Number of observations: 651.
t-statistics in parentheses in absolute values.

significant at less than the 10% level and sign opposite to shipping industry.
36 The large number of industries that we employ constitutes a non negligible fraction of the
Standard and Poor’s Composite Index. As a robustness check we ran the regressions in which
we employed Standard and Poor’s Railroad Index instead as the market index. The railroad
index is a good instrument because it reflects fluctuations in economic activity with an impact
on transportation, but it should not be affected by dual rate contracts. The results that we
obtain using the railroad index are very similar to thosewith the composite index. Those results
are available on the Journal of Industrial Economics website.
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In the remaining columns, we present alternative indexes of industries.
The industries are weighted by: industry net exports as a percentage of total
industry output in column 2, freight rates as a percent of the value of their
products in column 3 and both net exports and freight rates in column 4. The
results are very consistent with those obtained in column 1.
Table IX
Main importing and high freight cost industries












Court 1 0.006 0.017 0.016 0.022 0.003 0.013
(5.72) (15.77) (19.89) (15.18) (2.57) (13.20)
Court 2  0.003  0.010  0.015 0.023 0.001  0.002
(3.58) (12.30) (22.03) (20.96) (1.62) (2.30)
Court 3  0.006  0.010  0.007 0.004 0.015 0.002
(6.95) (12.52) (10.50) (3.62) (18.91) (3.26)
Court 4 0.009
  0.009 0.000 0.050 0.006 0.007
(9.14) (8.81) (0.06) (39.79) (6.92) (8.07)
Legislative 1 0.029
  0.001 0.025 0.053 0.013 0.033
(32.14) (0.95) (31.07) (45.18) (15.27) (38.03)
Legislative 2  0.011  0.010 0.050 0.005 0.004 0.010
(8.93) (8.00) (44.58) (3.27) (3.36) (8.57)
Legislative 3  0.025 0.045  0.020  0.006  0.002  0.007
(30.55) (53.01) (29.74) (5.30) (2.10) (8.97)
Notes: Number of observations: 651.
t-statistics in parentheses in absolute values.

significant at less than the 10% level and same sign as shipping industry.
Table VIII contains results for some specific industries that are included in 
our sample. We selected these particular industries because they should be 
especially sensitive to the behavior of liner conferences. In each of these 
industries, net exports are at least two percent of total output and freight 
rates represent at least two percent of the total value of the products. That is 
to say, these net exporting industries all satisfy some minimum level of 
hypothesized sensitivity. Furthermore, each of the displayed industries 
fulfills at least one of the following additional criteria: freight costs are at 
least seven percent of the total value of their output (very high freight costs), 
net exports constitute at least seven percent of their sales (very dependent on 
exports), or both net exports and freight costs are greater than four percent 
of total value (a combination of relatively high freight costs and relative 
dependence on exports). The individual industry regressions are quite 
consistent with one another, both across industries and across events. 
Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients make economic sense. The 
coefficients are nearly always smaller than those estimated for the ocean 
carriers, which is consistent with the view that dual-rate contracts provided a 
concentrated benefit to the ocean carriers and more dispersed costs among 
exporters. The industries especially supportive of the market power 
hypothesis are chemicals, office and business equipment, paper and rayon 
and acetate yarn. In each of those cases, the coefficients are significant and 
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with the expected sign under the hypothesis of market power in five or six of
the seven events, and are only significant and consistent with the efficiency
hypothesis for at most one event. The industry of this group offering the
weakest support is agricultural machinery. The results for that industry
support the market power and efficiency hypotheses an equal number of
times.37
In Table IX we present results for corresponding net importing
industriesFindustries that follow similar criteria to those of industries in
Table VIII: net imports are at least two percent of total output and freight
rates represent at least two percent of the total value of the products, and
industries must fulfill at least one of the following additional criteria: freight
costs are at least seven percent of the total value of their output, net imports
constitute at least seven percent of their sales, or both net imports and freight
costs are greater than four percent of total value. Net importing industries
should have benefited from dual rate contracts had they contributed to
market power. Thus, the signs of the coefficients would be the same as those
for the ocean carriers. But the results for these industries are far less
supportive of the market power hypothesis than those for net exporting
industries. With the exception of the beverage industries, there is evidence
for market power for three of the events (Court 3, Court 4, and Legislative
1). The results for the other events are more supportive of the efficiency
hypothesis, however. One possible explanation for the more equivocal
results is due to the fact that the firms making up the indexes are large
corporations. In any given industry, the largest firms tend to account for
most exports.38 It is highly probable, therefore, that the firmsmaking up our
indexes are larger exporters than other firms in their respective industries.
This means that even in industries that are net importers, the firms in our
samplemay export significant quantities. On average, firms in net importing
industries should still depend less on exports (and compete more with
imports) thanfirms in net exporting industries. Ideally, wewould like to have
exports by firmor the distribution of exporter firm size by industry, but those
data are not available.
Although the data consist only of large firms, any effects of market power
were probably more severe, not less, for small firms. Contemporary
observers noted that this was almost certainly true, because small firms
are less able to negotiate with carriers for concessions.39
37We also conducted estimations for the industries that do not meet the criteria discussed
above. Those industries should not have been nearly as sensitive to the events because of their
relative lack of export intensity or the relative unimportance of freight rates as a percent of the
value of their products. Not surprisingly, those estimations are not nearly as supportive of the
market power hypothesis as the ones on the industries selected in Table VIII. Those additional
results are available upon request.
38U.S. Department of Commerce (1999).
39U.S. House Subcomm. on Antitrust (1962), pp. 206–7.
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The econometric evidence strongly supports the contention that dual-rate
contracts were beneficial to ocean carriers, and detrimental to their
customers. The evidence validates the concerns expressed by the courts
and the U.S. Department of Justice, as well as the complaints by numerous
exporters as expressed in the congressional hearings.40
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Loyalty contracts are one of the main features that have characterized the
shipping industry for more than one hundred years. Several theoretical
contributions have shown the potentially strong anti-competitive effects of
these practices. In this paper we apply the event studymethodology to study
the evolution of firms’ returns during the 1950s, a period of regulatory
instability in the industry. The results indicate that loyalty (dual-rate)
contracts improved ocean carriers’ financial performance, and that the
contracts enabled carriers’ to exploit market power to the disadvantage of
their customers.
Exclusive contracts are an important issue in competition policy that has
received considerable theoretical attention, but relatively few empirical
treatments. The evidence from ocean shipping supports theoretical
arguments that such contracts convey market power.
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